



## Proper Names and Repression. A Freudian Finding

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**Received:** July 14, 2020

**Published:** August 28, 2020

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### Abstract

I intend to locate Freud's contributions in relation to personal names and repression. His most spreaded idea of the unconscious is a consequence of repression. Repression operates in three stages described in his metapsychology. In order to articulate his findings, it is necessary to highlight the way in which the personal name is tied to a lack. Without lack the reality-test could not be installed and the separation between conscious and unconscious could not be established. For Freud, the core of the unconscious is made up of agents of the representation (*Vorstellungrepräsentanz*). They are of the order of nonsense. In my opinion those representatives are letters. Letters of personal names are one of the first fixation materials (*Fixierung*). Fixation constitutes the first time of repression: It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the psychic apparatus to be founded. I also analyze another Freudian idea of the unconscious: the inherited unconscious. Freud deployed this idea in his last work.

**Keywords:** Proper Name; Repression; Primal Repression; Fixation; Letters

### Introduction

In Freud's times, there were no theoretical developments from other disciplines on the proper name to support his own findings. Nowadays, although in the matter of linguistics and philology the studies are still incipient, in other social disciplines such as anthropology, there is plenty of ethnographic material from which psychoanalysis could take valuable lessons. Only from anthropology -Frazer, specifically- is from which Freud took a number of contributions in order to consider the importance of the name.

We owe Freud the knowledge of the unconscious effects of the proper name, even though this transmission is disperse and not completely explicit. He recognized the importance of name in filiation, in duel, in identification and its compromise in the repression. He stated that the repression has 3 moments: 1)

primal repression or fixation (*Fixierung*), 2) Repression proper (*Verdrängung*) that is manifested, in the case of names, as a forgetting, and 3) return of the repressed [21]. The return of the repressed thing is the moment in which the formations of the unconscious appear: the dream, the joke, the symptom and the symptomatic actions.

When Freud works on the forgetting of personal names and particularly of an omission that happened to him, it links us in the last instance to thoughts related to death and sexuality. We ought to question this sentence, because said like that, it seems inscrutable. There's something of the order of the unrepresentable whether in death, whether in sexual life, or in the upcoming of a life.

There's a notion - the lack- that is not formulated by Freud as a concept, and without it, the proper name of the person wouldn't find its anchor. He referred to the lack in many ways but

I will highlight particularly its two formulations with regard to judgment. He wrote about the judgment in his early text *Project for a Scientific Psychology* [7] and in his text *Negation* [11]. In the first one, he states about the permanent component of the perceptive complex of the fellow human being. He identifies the helpful person as “subject” and there’s something about it that cannot be represented. He also called it *The Thing (Das Ding)*. He stated that *The Thing (Das Ding)* is a residue that cannot be subject to judgment by the infant [7]. *The Thing* is separated in two parts. Because of that separation the infant’s judgment begins. Later on, in his text *The Negation* Freud stated that a precondition for the setting up of reality testing is that objects which once brought real satisfaction, shall be lost [11]. The loss supposes its psychic register.

Then, here we have two ways of referring to lack. If there’s lack, a child comes to the world. If there’s death, it refers us back to a lack through mourning. It refers also to other previous losses, whether in one or more generations. If there is lack, there is an ideal to reach. If there is a lack, there is repression that divides the psychic apparatus between what the ego can bear and what it cannot. Both, death and sexuality, confront us with lack. It’s interesting to notice the frequency with which funerals and after-funeral pregnancies happen. Many films show this with a rather hilarious tone.

### Freud and the choice of the names of his loved ones.

Freud changed the name he was given at birth. His full name was Sigismund Shlomo Freud Nathansohn. Sigismund Shlomo was his paternal grandfather’s name and he changed it simply for Sigmund, that is to say, he suppressed two letters (i, s). This change he made in 1873, when he was very young, at 17 [28]. In order to keep that change, instead of signing “S. Freud”, hereafter he would sign as “Sigm. Freud”. Tesone [36] wonders where do suppressed letters go. A Jew not willing to be called like his grandfather is not common. It is, of course, a will to differentiate, but somehow he does not follow strict traditions of the ancestors. A frequent practice among Jews is to name the children after the parents. Freud broke up with this tradition not only with regard to his grandfather but also with his own children. He gave place to his desire. He chose the names for his children: Mathilde, Martin, Oliver, Ernst, Sophie and Anna.

“I had insisted on their names being chosen, not according to the fashion of the moment, but in memory of people I have been fond of. Their names made the children into revenants. And after all, I reflected, was not having children our only path to immortality?”[18:487].

These beloved ones for Freud were his teachers, excepting Oliver Cromwell [18], after whom he named his first son. For Freud the teachers are the surrogated of the parents, they are the way to sciences for children [20]; that was the case of Ernest Brücke and Jean Martin Charcot. He named two of his sons after them (Ernest and Martin). In the case of his daughters, their names are associated to women somehow linked to who his teachers had been. Mathilde in memory of Breuer’s wife; Anna Sophie because of the affection for Sophie Shwab and Anna Hammerschlag, as it is referred in a letter to Abraham from the 9<sup>th</sup> of January of 1908. They were niece and daughter of Samuel Hammerschlag, his Hebrew teacher.

However, the names for his children are not the only ones he chose. He also proposed the name for this brother Alexander, in memory of Alexander III “Magno or “The Great” because of his military feats. The achievements of the Macedonian conqueror were recited by 10 year old Freud to the family council, to argue why it would be important that name for the new born [29]. The name was chosen according both to the family ideals and to the cultural ideals of the epoch. This hero of Freud was a man that succeeded to conquer vast extensions of territory in few years, what later would have an impact on the hellenization of Europe. Freud’s acuteness would take him to the clue of the relation between the personal name and the ideal. This act in which Freud participated as a kid, would be the seed of theoretical development.

### The letter and the names in the tissue of the unconscious’s formations

Freud began the study of personal names by analyzing their forgetfulness and the substitute formations that occur in the attempt to remember them.

But even before, he already had an attentive ear to the way the letter manifested itself in the tissue of the symptom. This route, which isn’t casual, is called determinism or overdetermination.

He discovered that the letter, due to not meaning anything, it can easily become “ambassador” of skeins of thoughts. The subject carries their name and suffers the effects of the drives (*Trieb*) that are derived from the letter. The drives wouldn't exist without the heard letter that leads a way for them to follow.

A number in the dream or in any other formation of compromise, has also that function of being “ambassador” of something else, which is to say that it is good material to make possible condensation. The dream named “The injection of Irma” is a paradigmatic example of the condensation function of numbers. A number could have the function of a letter. He talks about the symptoms' operation mode: “What unites the affect and its reflex is often some ridiculous play upon words or associations by sound, but this only happens in dreamlike states when the critical powers are low” [25:209].

He conceives the symptom as a result of tissue.

“It contains nodal points at which two or more threads meet and there after proceed as one; and as a rule several threads which run independently, or which are connected at various points by side-paths, debouch into the nucleus. To put this in other words, it is very remarkable how often a symptom is determined in several ways, is 'overdetermined'.” [25: 290].

His idea of determinism is not referring to destiny in life, as it has been often misinterpreted. His notion of determinism refers to the way the letters draw on the drives and symptoms and on other formations such as dreams, jokes and failed acts. Freud stated that his cases of hysteria guided his listening very soon [25].

His incipient clinical practice, his autoanalysis and the attention given to personal names since his youth, prepared him to analyze the dreamlike figurability and particularly the ways in which the dream can deal with words in order to figurate them as images. Sometimes the dream is oriented by the sense and sometimes by the nonsense as a mode of condensation. The dream figures the personal names as things, and this interested Freud very much. “The work of condensation in dreams is seen at its clearest when it handles words and names” [17:295].

He shows that there's a variety of forms in which names can be presented in dreams. One of them is the presence of one or various characters, or a person mixed by condensation. He realized that, during the dream, in the name of a person there was a condensation of others with the same name or which name had the same letters [18]. The name can be presented with its multiple figuration. Another way in which it can be represented is when the name is referred to as the author or the name of a place whether it is complete or a particle condensed in a word. It can also be presented under a rébus<sup>1</sup> (a picture puzzle).

Freud wrote about a dream of autoanalysis related to a dissection of the lower of part of his own body, his pelvis and legs [18]. He analyzes this dream in various places; in that dream Freud figures with objects different personal names<sup>2</sup>. This dream will bring associations of his time being a student with Brücke, responsible for the physiology laboratory of the Vienna University. Freud's teacher urged him to investigate the nervous system of various species. He pushed him to publish. Freud kept postponing that decision. This is how he registered his name as author for the first time. He published his findings on the *Ammocoetes* fish (*Petromyzon planeri*) with which Freud closed the discussion among the supposed separation between inferior and superior animals [29]. His work was published at 22, in 1878, in the magazine of the academy of the Vienna University. This fish presents a very suggestive morphologic structure: It has a phallic form, with a mouth that could be considered a toothed vagina. An image that perhaps awoke his questions about bisexuality in human condition.

“In one of my dreams old Brücke had set me the task of making a dissection; ... I fished something out that looked like a piece of crumpled silver-paper. (...) The association to this (at which I arrived with some difficulty) was 'stanniol'. I then perceived that I was thinking of the name of Stannius, the author of a dissertation on the nervous system of fish, which I had greatly admired in my youth. The first scientific task which my teacher [Brücke] set me was in fact concerned with the nervous system of a fish, *Ammocoetes* [...] It was clearly impossible to make use of the name of this fish in a picture puzzle.” [18:413].

<sup>1</sup>Express words or sentences through drawings or images, parts of words, numbers or letters. It's a pictorial composition.

<sup>2</sup>Silver foil instead of Stanniol, Stannius

The importance for Freud of exploring its own pelvis eviscerated where the sex is anatomically situated, is revealed in the name of this dream and in the dream itself, even without associations. But the point here is to highlight the role that he gives to the letter. The letter in dreams, but also in other unconscious formations, is related to sexuality and death.

When in this dream he tries to figurate the gloomy, he uses the German word Graue or Grauen, "grey-haired", which is also a last name which is used by the side of sense. While when the dream is referred to an author, it leaves open plenty of aspects. And in the case of rebus, we know it is the way the dream figures a letter. The last names of his dream of self-analysis are: Brücke, his teacher, which also means "bridge". For Freud, that teacher was certainly a bridge in many ways. Besides the mentioned one, it's a bridge that takes him through his children to fame: "[...] that children may perhaps achieve what their father has failed to [18:455]". His fame wouldn't be known by him, but by his children.

Also, Silberer appears in that dream: a part of that name is represented as Silberpapier "silver paper", Stannius (author), Stanniol ("tin foil"). Freud won't tell what he found with the letters Si of his name in the pelvis, precisely where the tin foil appears. Which is to say, Freud is wondering for his own sexualization and the way in which his desire tends to express itself. The syllable Si was an acquisition of him when he changed his name Segismund (Se) for Sigmund (Si). The second letter "s" is suppressed in his new name.

In other scenes of that dream it's the other way around: what appears are the last names of authors of books about the feminine. His dream send him back to the time in which he changed his name. The appropriation of his name has two moments in his life. The first one comes with his first publication as author being almost an adolescent. The second one comes when he wants to transcend his name to immortality, with his findings about the dream. In both cases it is about the effects of his writing.

Freud stops to analyze the dream of children. He thinks that in the case of the little ones, the dream barely suffers disfiguration; instead, it intends to accomplish the desire that in vigil was left awaiting or frustrated. An interesting note related to the dream of his daughter Anna: "My youngest daughter, then nineteen

months old, had had an attack of vomiting one morning and had consequently been kept without food all day. During the night after this day of starvation she was heard calling out excitedly in her sleep: "Anna Fweud, stwawbewwies, wild stwawbewwies, omblet, pudden!" At that time she was in the habit of using her own name to express the idea of taking possession of something. The menu included pretty well everything that must have seemed to her to make up a desirable meal. The fact that strawberries appeared in it in two varieties was a demonstration against the domestic health regulations. It was based upon the circumstance, which she had no doubt observed, that her nurse had attributed her indisposition to a surfeit of strawberries. She was thus retaliating in her dream against this unwelcome verdict." [17:130].

But the kid does not only question her desire, represented with objects forbidden by the family, but she states before her name. Freud thinks she enunciates her own name "Anna Freud" as an act of possession, which is to be followed by the list of what she cannot eat but craves. What does act of possession mean for Freud? We could simply think that it's a shifter of the enunciation: "I, Anna Freud, speak", I take possession of the word. It's possible -though we're lacking context and her own associations- because she's talking asleep and baby-talk. This baby-talk is for me the most important: it seems to be what she cannot eat. What there's evidence about, from who listened to her, is that what she "eats" is the "r". A letter that a small child can't pronounce yet. It's a fricative syllable (Fre). The "r" letter is in her last name: Freud. It's also interesting that that letter is also in the German words Erdbeer (strawberry) and Eier (egg). In these two cases, the "r" appears at the end. But in her last name it's at the beginning. To eat this letter is an act of subjectivation. And therefore we could also say that that's what happens when the babies begin to talk.

Anna eats a letter of her paternal last name, the "r", which is also in the names of the forbidden objects. By eating it and repeating it she alters its pronunciation, she creates otherness. We would agree with Freud if we added: act of possession of a letter of her paternal surname, the "r", which is among the forbidden objects, and the letter "d", which is in the middle of the German word for strawberry (Erdbeer). By incorporating it, she makes her of her own, like the food in the totemic banquet. Porge [35] states that it is normal and frequent among children, when learning to read, to

omit some letters of their last name when reading or writing. Is a way “to eat”, a way to incorporate some letters of his/her father and register in filiation. Incorporation is a precursor mechanism of identification according to Freud.

The personal name in the dream is, in my opinion, what Freud called “the navel of the dream”. It is the point when something connects with the unknown [17].

Another unconscious formation is the joke, which won't let a personal name escape if it can give away a laugh. On the whole, we could say that the joke makes the narcissistic pretension of any personal name fall off. Nicknames often came out from a joke and they cause laughter. The joke treats the personal names with various techniques. The judgment is very important in all the formations of the unconscious, particularly in the joke because for Freud, the joke is a judgment that play.

The subject can carry in his name the narcissistic pretension of his parents in the letters that will accompany him throughout his life. And if there's no narcissistic pretension, anyway it will carry a message. Each person will do something different with it.

Let's see this joke referred by Freud.

“Proper names in general fall easy victims to this kind of treatment by the joke-technique. There were in Vienna two brothers named Salinger, one of whom was a Borsensensal [stockbroker; Sensal = broker]. This provided a handle for calling him ‘Sensalinger’, while his brother, to distinguish him, was given the unflattering name of ‘Scheusalinger’<sup>3</sup> [16:21].

The analysis of his forgetting and of his dreams made him notice how the personal names tend to fragmentation, so that with that fragments other substitutive formations can be produced. This way he showed to ways of substitution: one on the side of the sense, and others by the side of the letter, without sense.

Freud realized of the fact that personal names were particularly susceptible of being repressed [15], and that doesn't happen only when one is fatigued. The names are enigmatic. Moreover etymology, they enclose a world in which ancestral desires take

place. “Slips of the tongue do really occur with particular frequency when one is tired, has a headache or is threatened with migraine. In the same circumstances proper names are easily forgotten” [12:28].

Freud's finding when he analyzes the forgetting of the name of the Italian painter Signorelli is quite interesting [15]. Additionally, to everything that Freud refers to, it contains the three first letters of his own name: Sigmund. We know this is an over studied example and that Lacan made references to it in several occasions. Lacan highlights the German word Herr, translation for Signor<sup>4</sup>, something in the word of the subject is missing. Herr! It is an invocation to God. Then, in Seminar 5, he dedicates two sessions to this forgetfulness.

“It is not because this name is not caught that it is the lack: it is the lack of this name which makes that looking for the name, this lack in the place where this name should exercise this function, where he can no longer exercise it because a new meaning is required, which requires a new metaphorical creation”<sup>5</sup> [31].

Several of the substitute forms for the forgotten names, which return and Freud draws in his graph [15], are on the side of meaning. But there are aspects of the name that are untranslatable. It does not make sense. When the name is broken up and returned to memory in fragments, there are letters that insist on appearing as part of other words. Those letters are S, i, g, with which Sigmund's name begins and also Signorelli.

The proper name is a doorway to an unknown dimension in relation to death and sexuality. Not only in the case of Signorelli but always, since as Lacan stated, because of the fact of reproducing ourselves sexually, the death is compromised [30]. Freud remembers Orvieto's cathedral, he remembers the painter's frescoes, he topic of those, the painter's face... all that is from the order of representation and it's not repressed. What doesn't come to his mind is a word, a personal name, the painter's surname. Signorelli is not a representation. Le Gaufey [34] states that the representative of the representation is what is repressed. In that personal name whose first syllable is “Sig”, as in Sigmund, there's a maximum condensation. This word, that is not whichever, gathers, traps, binds an dendriform net, topics related to the father, to God,

<sup>3</sup>[‘Scheusal’ means ‘monstrous creature’].

<sup>4</sup>Lacan approaches this forgetting in the session of February 10<sup>th</sup>, 1958, and then in the Seminar 5, that took place on November 13<sup>th</sup> and 20 of 1957 in the same Seminar.

<sup>5</sup>French version reads: “Ce n'est pas parce que ce nom n'est pas attrapé que c'est le manque: c'est le manque de ce nom qui fait que cherchant le nom, ce manque à la place où ce nom devrait exercer cette fonction, où il ne peut plus l'exercer car un nouveau sens est requis, qui exige une nouvelle création métaphorique.” (31: 37).

to the name of Freud, to death and sexuality, to the event of his patient, to other things that Freud would not tell us and to other things that neither he knows.

### The personal name and the ideal of the ego

The forms of the ideal and the vicissitudes of the election of the name for the baby show its contradictions between both parents. Mother and father don't have the same wish. An ideal is something to reach; in that sense it is a route imposed to the child, whether it decides to follow it or to oppose to it, either way it is a reference.

The ideal of the ego is the inheritor of the lost narcissism to which we ought to give up due to the intervention of culture. The overestimation of the parents towards their children is a rebirth of the abandoned narcissism. But can we talk about rebirth? Is there a moment when the narcissism dies or is actually gave up? What is reborn is the hope that the unaccomplished dreams could be resituated so that the child realizes them. The critics of the parents to their child will shape that ideal of the ego. And the rebellions and disobedience of the child will lead to take distance from that.

The narcissist bet of denying castration, which is at stake in any personal name, fails. The child will be dethroned. The lofty name and its pretension fail. This fail is shown to us mostly in the unconscious formations: with the laughter in the case of the joke, when the phallic pretension is discovered and falls; with the forgetting that reinstalls the hole in the memory, when part of the name come back in fragments in the ideas association.

An ideal tends to suppress some drives and promotes others. This satisfaction that the drive looks for, never happens alone, but dialoguing with the personal name. The drives will adhere to certain words and certain letters. They will come into combination, as Lacan highlighted in the Seminar 11, as an assembly of dissimilar things [30].

The ideal of the ego is neither only familiar nor only singular; it's always in relationship with the cultural ideals that are part of the people's heritage.

Lacan stated that if the personal name was absolutely personal, there wouldn't be homeland<sup>6</sup> [31,40]. Meanwhile, Freud says that the ideals are found in the values attributed to deities in each

culture, as well as what intellectuals locate and promote [10]. We would also add artists, leaders and heroes, as well as shamans and wise men in indigenous and tribal peoples.

Freud wrote in several texts, the way in which the ideal of the ego participates of repression; thus it's an agent of the latter. In order to approach the ideal-because it is never reached-, to suppress much other drives is needed. "We can say that the one man has set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual ego, while the other has formed no such ideal. For the ego the formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression" [23]. When parents assign an ideal place for the child, they create a precondition for establishing the unconscious.

For the ideal of the ego to be produced, an inscription of the castration must have been produced before, even as an incipient way. It ceased being an ideal-ego, it ceased to be His/Her Majesty the Baby. Now the child has an ideal to reach ahead. The child will need to put distance between that ideal of the parents and itself in order to rewrite the name. Allouch stated that the castration is produced both in the symbolic field as speaking being and in the imaginary field, as castration in being [1]. Thus, requires logical times: a very early one, when the infant begin to talk, and another later [1]. This second way won't stop inscribing until the privation of the phallus as a radically lost object in the imaginary field is produced.

At the end of his work on narcissism, Freud says that the ideal of the ego is an instance that allows to understand the mass phenomena. And that besides the individual component, there's a social one. It is also the common ideal of a family, an estate or a nation [23].

The personal name is an association, perhaps with a series of other names, it comes from the Id from each of the parents. It's the most condensed form of the Id.

### Mourning, suppression, repression

The purpose of this section is to focus on the terms (*unterdrückt/unterdrücten*) that Freud uses in various passages of his works. Strachey translate them to English as suppressed. According to Freud, the suppressed seems to contribute to the repression

<sup>6</sup>In Mexico, in 22 of the 31 entities, the most common name is Guadalupe or Lupe (short for Guadalupe). Source: INEGI: México

(*Verdrängung*). This one occurs after. To suppress implies not to display an idea, as a sort of inhibition. But this is not so clear, because there is an enormous range of circumstances and modalities of such suppressions or sudden stoppings for an intention or expectation to unfold.

The issue of the personal names and the mourning was approached by Freud in his text *Totem and taboo* [19]. Freud refers there to the cultural practices of some aboriginal groups. But he did not stop to analyze the implications of this issue in its singular dimension, in specific cases of current times. The personal names, whether they are repeated or not, they carry a transgenerational history. The personal name is somehow compromised by certain letters -or by the whole name- with a previous mourning or by the way of mourning through several generations. The nomination of a personal name for a child always refers to the lack that is found in the in the origin of the advent of a new life. The personal name can be involved with a lack and its negation or with a lack and its disavowal, or with a lack that precludes a metaphorical creation. Not all personal names involve the functioning of the paternal metaphor. Each personal name carries in less or greater manner the acceptance, resignation or impossibility of subjectivize a previous loss.

When Freud introduces the subject of the forgetting of personal names, he was processing at least four significant losses. This is not a coincidence. At that moment, distressed by father's death, he seemed to deny his mourning saying: "No one is irreplaceable! There are nothing but revenants: all those we have lost come back!" [18]. Besides from the mourning for his father, Freud was grieving a friend recently dead and bewail the news of the suicide of a patient that he cared a lot.

Freud had in that time a theoretical idea of mourning that changed after the death of his daughter Sophie in 1920, though in strict sense it changed until his grandson Heinerle (Sophie's youngest son) died in 1926. His daughter's death left him inconsolable, but the subjectivation of her death happened with his grandson death. Nevertheless, Freud didn't modify his theory about mourning, he only left proof of it in his correspondence, when he lamented he couldn't bare being with other grandchildren since Heinerle's death [33].

The suppression requires being approached with more detail in some other time. In this case I will only point out what I can reach to notice. Freud used this term in several cases, I'll point out three: A) when he displays his forgetting of the painter Signorelli, he enumerates the conditions for the forgetting to happen: 1) certain predisposition for his forgetting; 2) a process of suppression taking place a little earlier, and 3) the possibility of establishing an extrinsic association between the name at issue and the previously suppressed element<sup>7</sup> [15]. When Freud talked with his trip companion and forgot the name Signorelli, he had previously silenced some ideas because he didn't consider convenient to share them with a stranger. Some thoughts was censored and suppressed. So when we have an intention of throwing away a thought occur immediately the forgetting. "By the side of simple cases where proper names are forgotten there is a type of forgetting which is motivated by repression" [15:7].

And adds

"The lost name has touched on a 'personal complex' in me. The relation of the name to myself is one that I should not have expected and is usually arrived at through superficial associations (such as verbal ambiguity or similarity in sound); it can be characterized quite generally as an oblique relation" [15:22].

B) He speaks of suppression in order to name one of the destinations of the emotions. In his work about "The unconscious" he clarifies that the feelings cannot be repressed, and he proposes three destinations for emotions: 1) the affect remains, 2) they move into another feeling, 3) they are suppressed, which means that their development is hindered [22].

And C) When adulthood is reached, the expectations of greatness once had as a child, must be abandoned, when realizing that those goals were not achievable. But when a child is born, the expectation of greatness returns. Only now that cherished objective must be carried out by the child. So, the suppression of those expectations is relative. That narcissistic ideal is never given up. The term suppression could be related to the effort of abandoning adults' expectations of greatness. That effort is only temporary. He pointed it out in relation with his child Oliver, in his work *The Interpretation of Dreams*, as we mentioned at the beginning.

<sup>7</sup>German version said: "[...] 1) eine gewisse Disposition zum Vegessen desselben, 2) eninen kurz vorher abgelaufenen Unterdrückungsvorgang, 3) die Möglichkeit, eine äußerliche Assoziation zwischen dem betreffenden Namen und dem vorher unterdrückten Element herzustellen (5:70).

Each of these three circumstances where something is suppressed, have different implications. There are suppressions for painful reasons. However, they are very different from each other, not only because of the significance of the lost family member for the bereaved, but also because of the social context in which the loss occurs and the reasons for it. The importance of that suppressed is very different.

When parents lose an infant child, they had no opportunity to weave expectations and traces of life around the child's proper name. Expectations and longings could only be unfolded and woven with the child's initiatives in existence itself and in daily treatment. After the loss, if they have another child, they will carry the previous grief with them. Since a mourning at such a young age had no symbolic rails, no traces, no memory traces, no words to draw the hole of said loss. So, the next infant, even if he or she has another name, maybe will carry the unrepresentable from the previous loss. In addition, the new infant will suffer the silence of parents who do not want to remember painful feelings or touch that unbearable pain again. The letters chosen for his new name will inevitably carry some of the previous loss, but the new son or daughter will not be able to reposition himself if he or she has the silence of his parents. I know this from my own life experience and because it has also been an observation of my clinical experience.

A premature death leaves very few traces. Then the loss of the infant is even more unrepresentable. If this is the case, the suppression of expectations, due to the death of the infant, has totally different characteristics from the other forms of suppression listed by Freud.

### The nucleus of the unconscious and the invention of a term

Writing this section in English is not easy. Strachey's translation of Freud's complete works into English makes a simplification in very important notions. This doesn't happen in the Spanish version, work commented by him<sup>8</sup>. To translate *Trieb*, he uses the term instinct, which would correspond in German to *Instinkt* and not to *Trieb*. Instinct is a fixed, stereotyped pattern inherited through chromosomes, characteristic of the species. *Trieb*, on the

other hand, is a notion that is not inherited in chromosomes, it is made up partly of somatic energy and partly that is ideational. The ideational component is unique in every human being. There is a maternal instinct in animals, it is characteristic of its species. But there is no maternal instinct in humans. Each mother faces her motherhood in a completely different way from each other, based on her history as a daughter.

Another translation that I don't find accurate is "instinctive impulse" for *Triebregung*, instead of drive-motion.

There are several ways to formalize what is found clinically. Each author turns to the literature that has been produced in its historical moment. Someone even appeal to outdated terms for reasons that we ignore. There are authors who resort to terms that are outdated. In metapsychology Freud uses the term *Vorstellung* (representation). According to Le Gaufey [34], this notion comes from the Port Royal Logic of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, which is inadequate to convey what he has found in his practice. So Freud was not satisfied with the *Vorstellung* because it was insufficient. He found himself in the need to propose the *Vorstellungspräsentanz* (unconscious agent of the re-presentation).

The instance of representation (*Vorstellung*) corresponds to the ego and has an imaginary consistency. The unconscious agent representing to a representation (*Vorstellungspräsentanz*) is no longer imaginary. It is of the order of nonsense, of what does not mean anything by itself, such as a letter or a syllable. In the unconscious there are no representations, there are only letters. They are letters that are not isolated or as a simple stock in the brain. It is a thorough organization of the letters that works with metaphoric and metonymic substitutions. The unconscious letters are subjected to a very high condensation.

Le Gaufey [34] remarks: the memory is made out of disconnected memory traces that are related and make up a scene, so the memory traces lose the quality of pure trace, to exist as an integral part of a memory, which is always a representation. Representation is forged from representatives just as memory is forged from memory traces, eventually very heterogeneous in terms of their origin [34].

<sup>8</sup>Etchevery translated the Spanish version in the Amorrortu publishing house in 1981. He wrote a text called: "Sobre la versión castellana" in the Complete Works. There he dedicates a section to analyze why translate drive (pulsión) and not instinct (instinto). Freud does not use *Instinkt* in German but *Trieb*.



This is the reason why the unconscious agents of the drive find their concurrence in a “phantasmatic representation”. This is why the *Vostellungrepräsentanz* is the agent of the representation and not the obscure term that the Dictionary of Laplanche and Pontalis proposes: representative-representation.

If a personal name is forgotten, and in the effort to remember other names arrive, then the name also participates in the primal repression. And in fact, it has a very important role there: the personal name is the first point of fixation (*Fixierung*), the chair of a future subject, a first psychological and social inheritance of the parents. The name is made of language, and assigns a familiar and social place. Those letters of the name are like the first stitches of a fabric; it will be the foundation of the unconscious. The representatives of the representation are not contents, they are letters. He claims that the nucleus of the Unconscious are inherited mental formations [22], something analogous<sup>9</sup> to instinct in animals.

His notion of inheritance was influenced by the evolutionism of his time.

“[...] the nucleus of the unconscious mind; and whatever part of that heritage has to be left behind in the advance to later phases of development, because it is unserviceable or incompatible with what is new and harmful to it, falls a victim to the process of repression” [26:204]. Today we read the notion of inheritance in psychoanalysis as a discursive inheritance.

At the end of his life, in his last work on Moses, he once again seeks to ask himself about the truth and seeks to tie the ontogenetic with the phylogenetic. He wonders if the memory regarding Moses that was lost in the past with two characters named Moses and a time that mediates between each of them, is the evidence that gives a phylogenetic site to the latency phase [3]. If totemism corresponds to the Oedipus, then the popular memory of Moses (or two Moses) would account for a phase of amnesia regarding

the split memory of a father<sup>10</sup>. This would justify his phylogenetic reference to what in ontogenesis is the child’s latency that would divide sexuality in two stages, as he stated in his Three Essays.

In the Moses we find the following:

“We must finally make up our minds to adopt the hypothesis that the psychical precipitates of the primaeval period became inherited property which, in each fresh generation, called not for acquisition but only for awakening. In this we have in mind the example of what is certainly the ‘innate’ symbolism which derives from the period of the development of speech, which is familiar to all children without their being instructed, and which is the same among all peoples despite their different languages”<sup>11</sup> [8:132].

Freud finds that in the child past forms lived by previous generations return and he quotes the expression “return of the repressed” (“*Widerkehr des Verdrängten*”). He gives as an example the symbolism that he considers congenital [12]. “Here I am not using the term “the repressed” in its proper sense. What is in question is something in a people’s life which is past, lost to view (*Verschollen*), superseded and which we venture to compare with what is repressed in the mental life of an individual” [8:132].

Freud argues that there is a kind of hole in history, something evicted from it. That is why he equates it analogously to repression. That dislodged, disappeared (*Verschollen*) returns in an attempt to fill up or cover (*Ausfüllung*)<sup>12</sup> that hole. Likewise, when he talks about primordial fantasies, he says that the child only fills in the gaps of the individual truth with a prehistoric truth.

So the notion of repression finds a nuance here, which is not that of an eviction effort (*Verdrängung*) and in the return of that “repressed” there would also be a difference. If something was not evicted, neither would it return to the way it was posed in its metapsychology. But then we don’t understand how Freud imagined that other repression that, while hereditary, is neither

<sup>9</sup>The underline is mine.

<sup>10</sup>One idealized, deified, made sacred, and the other profane of dubious reputation, both with the same name. It is the same split character. In Mexico we also have one: Quetzalcóatl, one according to the glosses is a divinity, idealized, perfect, civilizing, and another Quetzalcóatl that has a human dimension and suffered from various vices.

<sup>11</sup>German version reads: “Wir entschließen uns endlich zur Annahme, daß die psychischen Niederschläge jener Urzeiten Erbgut geworden waren in jeder neuen Generation nur der Erweckung, nicht der Erwerbung bedürftig. Wir denken hierbei an das Beispiel der sicherlich “mitgeborenen” Symbolik, die aus der Zeit der Sprachentwicklung stammt, allen Kindern vertraut ist, ohne daß sie eine Unterweisung erhalten hätten, un die bei allen Völkern trotz der Verschiedenheit der Sprachen gleich lautet.” (6:130).

<sup>12</sup>I thank Mario Orozco Guzmán for his support in understanding this German term and what Freud means there in that other notion of “repression” that *Verdrängung* is not exactly.

*Verdrängung* (eviction effort) nor Fixation (*Fixierung*) or primal repression; but something past, disappeared, overcome.

If there are no representations in the unconscious, Freud doesn't explain how is it that the child symbolizes things whose imaginary recreates what was lived by ancient cultures, somehow like the thought of the myths that occupied Freud so much. There are main actions in a mythemes that the child recreates with his imagination. And it is one of the aspects that Jung called an archetype. Freud clarifies that what he means is not in Jung's sense.

Lacan reads this idea in another way, relying on Levi-Strauss's *Wild Thought* to put a distance from Freud's notion of the unconscious and propose his own.

Before any experience, any individual deduction, even before collective experiences are inscribed in it which can only be related to social needs, something organizes this field, inscribes its initial lines of force, which is this function that Claude LÉVI-STRAUSS, in his critique of totemism, shows us to be his truth, and the truth which reduces its appearance to this function of totemism, namely a primary classificatory function. [...] Nature - to say the word - provides signifiers and these signifiers inaugurate human relations, give their structures and model them. The important thing is this: it is that we see there the level where, before any formation of the subject, of a subject who thinks, who is located there, that counts, it is counted, and in this "counted", the counter is already there! He then has to recognize himself in it, and to recognize himself as "counting"<sup>13</sup> [30:11].

So far we have referred to repression when it operates a cleavage. But as Françoise Davoine<sup>14</sup> points out in psychoses, the function of the word has failed, because it failed socially and therefore

there is no adequate functioning of repression. It is something that remains pending to investigate further. Freud did not work with psychosis, but Schreber's autobiographical text, which he analyzed, allows us to see the effects of the name on delirium insofar as repression fails. This observation is highlighted by García Silva: "Schreber's father was named Daniel Gottlieb Schreber. In German Gott is God and lieb is dear, pleasant, kind (Liebe is love on the other hand), so that the surname as a compound word clearly suggest "God's dear". We know that Daniel Paul Schreber delusion consists of emasculation in order to be possessed by God through his rays, since he is the only one who is not a soul created without neglect and it is then he, through whom God can repopulate to the world<sup>15</sup>." [27:95].

In this case, a signifier could not be fixed, the *Verdrängung* has failed. The last name returns in a delirious way [13]. Schreber asks himself and tries to answer who is him to the Other. He reconstructs reality with delirium. The name of his father Gottlieb is very important to that delusional reconstruction.

## Conclusion

Freud proposes that it is not licit to sexualize the reasons for the repression [26], which contradicts his finding in the forgetting of Signorelli. The motives are sexual inasmuch as without lack there is no repression. Lack exists for reproducing us through sex. Signorelli's Forgetfulness Paradigm takes place after four losses: the failure of the medical ideal upon the death of a patient, a context of mourning for the patient himself, a mourning for a friend and mourning for his father. They are reasons linked to death and sexuality. Although Freud does not share his analysis of these two great "topics", they both refer us to the lack and to the unrepresentability that exists in each of these aspects.

<sup>13</sup> French version said: "Avant toute expérience, toute déduction individuelle, avant même que s'y inscrivent les expériences collectives qui ne sont rapportables qu'aux besoins sociaux, quelque chose organise ce champ, en inscrit les lignes de force initiales, qui est cette fonction que Claude LÉVI-STRAUSS, dans sa critique du totémisme, nous montre être sa vérité, et vérité qui en réduit l'apparence de cette fonction du totémisme, à savoir une fonction classificatoire primaire. [...] La nature - pour dire le mot - fournit des signifiants et ces signifiants organisent de façon inaugurale les rapports humains, en donnent les structures et les modèlent. L'important est ceci: c'est que nous voyons là le niveau où, avant toute formation du sujet, d'un sujet qui pense, qui s'y situe, ça compte, c'est compté, et dans ce « compté », le comptant déjà y est ! Il a ensuite à s'y reconnaître, et à s'y reconnaître comme «comptant». " (30:11).

<sup>14</sup> Oral communication on the occasion of his Seminar "Transfer as interference in the psychoanalysis of psychosis and trauma", Universidad Autonoma de Querétaro, May 2018.

<sup>15</sup> The original Spanish versión reads: "El padre de Schreber se llamaba Daniel Gottlieb Schreber. En alemán *Gott es Dios y lieb es querido, agradable, amable* (por su parte *Liebe es amor*), por lo que el apellido en tanto palabra compuesta, sugiere claramente "el querido de Dios". Sabemos que el delirio de Daniel Paul Schreber consiste en la emasculación para poder ser poseído por Dios mediante sus rayos, pues es el único que no es un alma *echa* (sic) a *la ligera* y es entonces él, por medio del cual Dios puede repoblar al mundo." [27: 95].

Freud asserts that the nucleus of the unconscious are inherited psychic formations. We agree with this idea if the inherited is from family discourse, from the fantasies that parents have to assign a certain place to their infant. This occurs even when those fantasies have not yet been unfolded, or are not shown or displayed.

When Freud interrogates himself about the early effects of the language and the proper name, he deduces that there is an awakening, revival or rebirth of what has inhabited other generations. At the nucleus of the unconscious there are only the agencies representing the psychic part of the drive (*Vorstellungrepräsentanz*) and in my opinion, it is Freud's way of naming the letter "theoretically". That would discard Freud's hypothesis that this return is the result of evolution. We recognize the evolution of species, the improvement of organic structures and the disappearance of organs that are no longer required. But lack, desire and repression exist because of language. In my opinion, the phylogenesis that psychoanalysis is interested in is the one produced by what inhabits in the language as a precipitate of the experiences of a people in each language.

If psychic precipitates are only to be "awakened" "revived" or "reborn," it almost seems that we are witnessing a Platonic idea unless we subordinate it to language. Anyway there is something dislodged, disappeared from history and from language itself. So Freud's idea that a proper name assigned to a child in memory of parents, grandparents or great-grandparents brings the dead back to life, is true. We understand by resurrection the reappearance of a particular trait that will enter a new combinatory with many other aspects that are no longer the same, beginning with the historical moment, both social and that of the couple.

Interestingly, one of the first signs of postmenopausal memory failure is forgetting proper names.

The analysis will do with their name something different than the possibly unconscious request of their parents. Throughout analysis they will analyze the fantasies with which their symptom is woven. The letters of the proper name carry both the thoughts that can be stifled or inhibited either preconsciously or consciously, and the dimension of what cannot even be thought or imagined.

In Freud's notion of fixation (*Fixierung*) or primal repression [21], there is a navel [17] that connects with the ineffable,

unthinkable, unrepresentable. This operation is very different from what happens with the proper name in the second stage of the repression (*Verdrängung*) [21]. Danièle Arnoux [2] analyzes a concept that Freud named in German *Die Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit*, which could be translated as considerations of figurability. This concept was not recognized as such in the Spanish translation. There are things that the psyche cannot figure out and others that it cannot put into words either. It remains for another time to locate the forms as Freud approached this unrepresentable in different ways. The proper name carries something of the unrepresentable of each human being and of the unrepresentable of their place in the world.

We said before that Tesone [36] wonders: Where do the deleted letters go? Some of the thoughts that arrive when choosing a name for a child cannot be shared with the couple. What happens with these thoughts? Is that where suppressed is involved? That suppressed is still active, although the selection of the suppressed may be the result of the elaboration of the child in combinatorial with chance. So the notion of *Verdrängung* that activates the notion of "content" of the unconscious is insufficient. If we recognize that the self has a transitive dimension that also implies telepathy of thoughts, which Freud was so interested in, to consider an inside and an outside is very relative. They are still auxiliary categories for thinking about subjectivation, but they are far from operating in what can be seen clinically.

### Acknowledgements

I thank Natalia Rivas Colín for the English version of this text and Dr. Mario Orozco Guzmán for his help in understanding a passage from the text of Freud's *Moses* in its German version. This text is a product of research sponsored by the Autonomous University of Querétaro.

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